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1. Introduction
Strategic trade policy aims at raising national welfare by
extracting monopolistic rents from foreign producers or
consumers. It is the central hypothesis of this paper that
such attempts of international rent shifting are most likely
to fail in a competitive environment with multinational
enterprises. The ever increasing potential for an inter-
nationalization of production makes national policy programs
targeted at national firms more and more obsolete.
The paper addresses two major questions:
- How does industrial policy influence the investment deci-
sions of multinational firms (section 2)?
- Why is the internationalization of production most pro-
nounced in high-tech industries (section 3)?
In the traditional theory of international trade, where
market imperfections and international investment flows were
simply defined away, there would have been no room for such
questions. Hence, the starting point of our analysis must be
the "new trade theories".f\ M
2. Exports versus foreign direct investment and industrial
policy
The theory of strategic trade policy was born in the early
eighties, when Spencer and Brander (1983) published their
first article on this subject. This theory - a child of the
marriage between trade theory and industrial economics - has
demonstrated that trade-related government intervention in
imperfect markets may shift rents from foreign countries to
the home country. In the past ten years, the literature on
this topic has grown rapidly. Its main results are that the
prospects for successful rent-shifting are most promising
- if scale economies are high, resulting either from static
fixed costs or dynamic learning curve effects,
- if barriers to entry are high, i.e. if potential entrants
do not compete the rents away,
- if governments are able to predict the competitive behav-
iour of firms (Cournot versus Bertrand),
- if the ex ante commitment of governments to support their
home industries is credible,
- if foreign governments do not retaliate,
- if the internal efficiency of domestic firms is not
affected by government protection,
For a comprehensive and up-to-date survey see Bletschacher
(1991).- 3 -
- if rent-seeking activities are of minor importance, i.e.
if national rents are not dissipated by interest groups
striving for government protection.
In view of all these 'ifs', governments are facing a severe
information problem in designing an optimal strategic trade
policy. Most academic observers agree, therefore, that free
trade - like honesty - is still the best choice. An ill-des-
igned approach to rent-shifting may well result in welfare
losses for all participants.
Despite these considerations politicians all over the world
feel increasingly attrated by the theory of strategic trade
policy. In some cases, it simply serves as a new intellec-
tual clothing for old protectionistic practices. In others,
in particular in the realm of microelectronics and infor-
mation technology, several European governments in cooper-
ation with the EC commission seem determined to develop a
strategic European industrial policy in order to break the
dominance of Japanese firms.
It may well be doubted that politicians are really aware of
all the above-mentioned caveats raised in the literature.
But it is almost certain, that they tend to neglect another
aspect that may be even more important for the success of
See, e.g., Commission of the European Communities (1990).- 4 -
trade interventions - the increasing importance of multi-
national enterprises (MNEs). In both the political concepts
and the theoretical literature on strategic trade policy
MNEs are almost non-existent. They still adhere to the
assumption that shifting production from one country to
another will more or less automatically result in corre-
sponding international shifts of rents. The possibility of a
mere profit transfer between headquarters and foreign af^-
filiates is simply ignored.
For an assessment of the impact of strategic policy measures
on the decisions of MNEs to relocate production it is
necessary to analyze the reasons for foreign direct invest-
ment between industrial countries. In contrast to direct
investment from industrial countries in less developed
countries, it can reasonably be assumed that international
factor price differences or the availability of natural
resources are only of minor importance. Instead, investment
flows between industrial countries are most likely to be
determined by firm-specific economies of scale.
The existence of economies of scale explains the regional
concentration of production. The existence of firm-specific
economies of scale explains why firm concentration is higher
The terms firm-specific and plant-specific economies of
scale were introduced by Markusen (1984). According to
Helpman (1984), firm-specific economies of scale result
from so-called headquarter services that exhibit certain
public good properties for all plants within an MNE.- 5 -
than plant concentration. The existence of barriers to trade
(artificial or non-artificial) explains why multiplant firms
of industrial countries may prefer to establish production
facilities in other industrial countries instead of ex-
porting their products to the foreign market, i.e. it
explains why multiplant firms go multinational.
The situation of a firm facing a decision whether to export
or to establish a foreign affiliate can be illustrated by
the average cost curves that correspond to these options
(Figure 1). The two parts of the figure represent two
markets for one specific good. Factor prices and production
technology of the two countries are assumed to be identical.
It is assumed that total production costs consist of con-
stant marginal costs, plant-specific fixed costs, and some
additional fixed costs that are firm-specific but not
plant-specific (brand name, R&D etc.). ac represents the
cost curve of the parent company in its home market. Total
sales in the home market, depending on domestic demand and
the competitive behaviour of the parent company, are given
by 00'. The dotted part of ac would denote average costs of
exports to the foreign market if there were no trade bar-
riers. In the presence of barriers to trade, export costs of
the parent company are given by ac .
The parent company may also choose to establish a foreign
affiliate. The cost curve of the affiliate ac is determined
9- 6 -
Figure 1 - Average Cost Curves with Firm-Specific and Plant-
Specific Economies of Scale
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by plant-specific fixed costs that are lower than the fixed
costs incorporated in ac , by constant marginal costs that
and by additional marginal are identical to those of ac
P'
costs that arise from supervising and monitoring production
abroad.
An independent foreign competitor faces the same conditions
as the parent company. Its cost curve ac. is identical to
ac but with its origin in 0' and not in 0. If total demand
Similar "costs of overseas production" occur in the
MNE-model of Krugman (1983).- 7 -
in the foreign country exceeds O'B, the independent firm has
a cost advantage, otherwise it cannot compete with exports
of the parent company or production of the affiliate. With
foreign demand below O'A the foreign market will be com-
pletely furnished by exports from the parent company.
When foreign demand lies in the range between O'A and O'B,
the parent company will replace its exports by foreign
production of an affiliate.
Under different assumptions about trade barriers and the
relative size of fixed and marginal costs, it is also poss-
ible that ac. cuts ac left of ac . In that case, estab-
l e a
lishing a foreign affiliate would not be profitable under
any demand conditions. Thus, high firm-specific fixed costs,
low plant-specific fixed costs, low additional costs of
Of course, it must be explained why the independent firm
from the foreign country does not decide to set up an
affiliate in the home country and to drive the parent
company out of the market. The answer to this question
given by Krugmann (1983) is the assumption that there are
many multinational firms producing differentiated pro-
ducts, some of them located in the home country, others in
the foreign country. Firm-specific fixed costs prevent
either country from producing the whole range of products,
and transport costs or other trade barriers induce foreign
direct investment. - If it is further assumed (deviating
from the Krugman model) that scale economies relative to
market size are high enough to preclude monopolistic
competition, each firm posesses some monopolistic power
and is able to earn rents. With this interpretation in
mind, ac. can be regarded as the cost curve of a potential
competitor which is actually engaged in producing a dif-
ferent product but which would immediately enter the
market of the parent company if rents would be higher than
in its own market.- 8 -
producing in foreign countries and high barriers to trade
are favourable to foreign direct investment.
Industrial policy can directly influence these cost curves.
External protection by increased trade barriers (tariffs for
instance) affects ac , and internal protection by subsidies
affects ac.. If there was no foreign direct investment, both
external and internal protection from the foreign government
would strenghten the position of the independent firm.
Apparently, this is the mode of action that politicians have
in mind when adopting protective policy measures.
Under the conditions described in Figure 1, however, the
impact of industrial policy is quite different. An increase
of trade barriers still shifts ac upward, but leaves ac
unchanged. Now, the competitiveness of the independent firm
is not improved. Instead, foreign direct investment is
promoted at the expense of export activities by the parent
company.
The same applies to production subsidies. If the government
of the foreign country is not able to discriminate against
the affiliate of the parent company, a subsidy on production
in the foreign country will shift ac. and ac by the same
l a
amount. In the EC, for instance, such a discrimination is
not only hampered for practical reasons but also by legal
constraints. According to Article 58 of the EEC treaty— Q —
European companies and foreign-based companies that are
producing in the EC area must be treated on equal terms.
The only way to improve the competitiveness of the independ-
ent firm would be to pay a subsidy on firm-specific fixed
costs by the foreign government. This would shift ac.
downward and leave the other cost curves unchanged. It must
be recognized, however, that this effect could easily be
offset by retaliating subsidies to the parent company from
the government in the home country. Moreover, in the absence
of retaliation the parent company may choose to relocate the
subsidised firm-specific activity to the foreign country. If
this is the case, it is virtually impossible to give domes-
tic firms a competitive edge by industrial policy measures.
3. The significance of multinational activities in high-tech
industries
In the past, the existence of MNEs was largely ignored in
the design of industrial policy. Trade-related measures and
subsidy programs were mainly trageted at national enter-
prises, and the possibility of by-passing protectionist
barriers by foreign direct investment was not taken into
account. In the course of the eighties, however, European
policy makers have increasingly been confronted with in-
ternationalization strategies of firms.- 10 -
The first case were photocopiers, where the European Com-
mission imposed an anti-dumping duty on imports from Japan
in order to protect the Italian producer Olivetti. The
affected Japanese company, Olympus, reacted by shifting its
production to the United States - correctly assuming that
the Commission would not run the risk of trade conflicts
with the U.S. government.
The most prominent case was that of the Japanese car-maker
Nissan, which was suffering from "voluntary" export re-
straint agreements with the EC. Nissan went directly into
the lion's den and installed a "screw-driver" factory for
assembling its Bluebird in Great Britain. The British gov-
ernment highly welcomed this investment within its terri-
tory, not for the sake of rents but for the sake of jobs.
The French and the Italian governments grumbled but were
unable to drive Nissan back. The recent agreement between
the EC and Japan explicitly takes into account the existence
of Japanese affiliates producing cars within the EC.
The limited scope of national industrial policy in an inter-
dependent world economy has also been demonstrated in the
case of JESSI - the EUREKA project that aims at developing
an European 64-megabit chip. JESSI is mainly intended to
break the dominant position of Japanese firms in the chip
i
For further details on the trade negotiations in the
motorcar industry see Bletschacher, Klodt (1991).- 11 -
market by establishing an own European technology base in
this area. JESSI is somewhat open for participation of U.S.
firms, but - of course - it does not want to share technical
knowledge with Japanese firms.
One participant in the JESSI project is the British company
International Computers Ltd. (ICL). In spring 1990, it was
bought up by Fujitsu from Japan. This acquisition threw the
JESSI board into deep trouble. A complete exclusion of ICL
from the project was not feasible - mainly for political
reasons. Instead, the JESSI board decided to restrict
participation of ICL to some rather unimportant sub-pro-
jects. Perhaps, Fujitsu should have waited until ICL would
have been deeper involved in the whole project.
It can be expected that the interference from foreign direct
investment on the effectiveness of protection will be an
issue of increased importance in the years to come. Kravis
and Lipsey (1989) have reported a continuously rising share
of U.S.-owned foreign affiliates in world trade. Since 1986
the share of overseas affiliates in world exports of manu-
factured goods even exceeds the corresponding share of their
parent companies.
The position of U.S. multinationals is most distinct in
high-tech industries (Table 1). Moreover, their market share
in the high-tech sector is rising, whereas it is declining
in other sectors. In their regression analyses, Kravis and- 12 -
Lipsey found that R&D is a better predictor of market
success of multinationals than, say, advertising expendi-
tures or international wage differentials.
Table 1 - World Market Share of U.S. Multinationals by























Source: Kravis, Lipsey (1989).
This development is not a U.S.-specific phenomenon. The
statistics on the world's largest industrial enterprises
gathered by John Dunning and his team from the University of
Reading show that the ratio of sales by overseas affiliates
to total sales of MNEs increased by more than six percentage
points in the high-tech sector as compared to an increase of
less than four percentage points for manufacturing on
average (Table 2).
What are the driving forces behind the ongoing interna-
tionalization of production and why is it most pronounced in
high-tech industries? The public good character of technical
knowledge only explains why firm specific economies of scaleBibliofhelc
des fnstituts fur Weltwirtscfri
- 13 -
are most significant in R&D-intensive industries. It does
not explain, however, why the companies did not fully take
advantage of these opportunities in earlier times.





























(a) Sales of overseas affiliates and associate companies
(excluding goods imported from parent for resale)
divided by total worldwide sales of group.
Source: Dunning, Pearce (1985).
The crucial point seems to be the relative size of trans-
action cost disadvantages of overseas production. Some costs
of supervising and monitoring production in a foreign
country such as language and cultural barriers or the lack
of experience with a different legal system are by and large
identical for all industries. Others that are related to
intrafirm communication between headquarters and plants
depend on the sophistication of production. In general,
high-tech goods require more sophisticated production
techniques than low-tech goods. As a consequence, the in-- 14 -
tensity of intrafirm communication can be expected to in-
crease with R&D intensity.
Replacing exports by foreign direct investment basically
means replacing trade in goods by trade in information. High
costs of transmitting information across national borders
prevent R&D intensive firms from becoming MNEs despite an
above-average potential for exploiting firm-specific econ-
omies of scale. This probably explains why the overseas
production ratio in high-tech industries was even lower than
in manufacturing as a whole in the seventies (see above
Table 2).
The situation significantly changed with the rapid diffusion
of modern information and communication technologies. New
developments in microelectronics facilitated communication
across long distances by providing a variety of new tech-
niques and by substantially reducing the costs of trans-
mitting information. Hence, internationalization of pro-
duction was increasingly attractive for research-intensive
industries. Speaking in the language of Figure 1, the micro-
electronics revolution led to a sizable downward shift of
the cost curve ac .
a
Due to the reduced costs of international flows of infor-
mation, some multinationals are even able to shift part of
their headquarter services to foreign countries. The- 15 -
research laboratories of IBM at Riischlikon (Switzerland) are
no longer an outstanding exception but just another example
for an international research strategy that has been adopted
by other MNEs as well. All in all, the research intensity of
foreign affiliates in high-tech industries is already more
than half as high as the research intensity of their parent
companies (Table 3). As a consequence, MNEs are more and
more able to participate in those subsidy programs of
foreign countries that are intended to promote domestic pro-
duction of headquarter services.
Table 3 - R&D Intensity(a) of Parent Companies and Overseas
Affiliates by Industry, 1982













(a) R&D expenditures as a percentage of corresponding
sales.
Source: Dunning, Pearce (1985).
Presumably, the costs of information and communication will
continue to decline in the years to come. This change in
relative prices will foster communication-intensive activ-
ities. It will be increasingly difficult, therefore, to- 16 -
ignore the existence of MNEs in the design of rent-shifting
industrial policy.
4. Where do the rents go?
The transfer of profits between headquarters and foreign
affiliates appears to be not very difficult. The internal
prices charged for headquarter services or the transfer
prices in intrafirm trade cannot effectively be controlled
from outside the company. Hence, attracting a highly
profitable industry to the home country does not ensure an
attraction of rents if that industry is dominated by MNEs.
Very little is known about the distribution of rents within
multinational firms. A profit maximising textbook firm would
surely choose to transfer as much profits as possible to
low-tax countries. The reality seems to be more complex. It
has repeatedly been reported that U.S.-based multinationals
are shifting the bulk of their profits to the United States
2 even if they are running affiliates in foreign tax havens.
The increased potential for international technology
transfer seems also to play a major role in the rapid
catch-up of South-East Asian NICs. Those countries raised
exports in particular in those R&D intensive industries
where technical knowledge is not incorporated in people
and can easily be transferred across national borders
(Klodt, 1990).
2
For the structure of MNE profits disaggregated by parent
company and foreign affiliate see Stopford, Dunning
(1983).- 17 -
Interregional profit transfers are crucial for the question
which country will be able to skim part of MNE profits by
taxation. It is rather irrelevant, however, for the distribu-
tion of after-tax profits. In the end, monopoly rents
improve the value of the whole enterprise and add to the
wealth of the shareholders. A geographical redistribution of
rents would require a redistribution of shareholders. In the
presence of multinational enterprises industrial policy can
only influence the total amount of rents by providing more
or less subsidies, but not the international distribution of
rents.
If the internationalisation of production proceeds (as it
probably will), the only realistic objective of industrial
policy is to attract investment and jobs in particular in-
dustries to the home country. Sector-specific trade barriers
and subsidies will raise the share of the protected indus-
tries in domestic output and employment at the expense of
other industries. Thus, industrial policy may still work,
but it does not work in the sense of strategic policy any
longer, i.e. in the sense of international rent shifting.
It might be objected that monopoly rents may also acrue to
the workers of MNEs. If this were true, an international
shift of production could lead to at least partial rent
shifting. Empirical labour market research has indicated,
however, that the inter-industry wage structure is sur-
prisingly stable over time and across countries (Thaler,- 18 -
1989) . In the light of this evidence it seems rather un-
likely that a successful attraction of highly profitable
enterprises from abroad by industrial policy measures will
result in higher wages for domestic workers in the respect-
ive industry.
Industial policy makers must recognize that the "microelec-
tronics revolution" has facilitated the internationalization
of production and makes trade barries more and more look
like porous Swiss cheese. Despite the increasing political
concern about strategic trade policy there is an underlying
trend towards free trade which is fed by modern information
and communication technologies. To put it in the words of
Bhagwati (1988), the dog still barks but does not bite any
more.- 19 -
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